Identification of Monetary Policy Shocks in the Brazilian Market for Bank Reserves by Adriana Soares Sales & Maria Tannuri-Pianto
ISSN 1518-3548
Identification of Monetary Policy Shocks
in the Brazilian Market for Bank Reserves
Adriana Soares Sales and Maria Tannuri-Pianto
December, 2007










































P. 1-55  





Edited by Research Department (Depep) – E-mail: workingpaper@bcb.gov.br 
 
Editor: Benjamin Miranda Tabak – E-mail: benjamin.tabak@bcb.gov.br 
Editorial Assistent: Jane Sofia Moita – E-mail: jane.sofia@bcb.gov.br 
Head of Research Department: Carlos Hamilton Vasconcelos Araújo – E-mail: carlos.araujo@bcb.gov.br  
 
The Banco Central do Brasil Working Papers are all evaluated in double blind referee process. 
  
Reproduction is permitted only if source is stated as follows: Working Paper n. 154. 
 




General Control of Publications 
 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Secre/Surel/Dimep 
SBS – Quadra 3 – Bloco B – Edifício-Sede – 1º andar 
Caixa Postal 8.670 
70074-900 Brasília – DF – Brazil 
Phones: (5561) 3414-3710 and 3414-3567 





The views expressed in this work are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Banco Central or  
its members. 
 
Although these Working Papers often represent preliminary work, citation of source is required when used or reproduced. 
 
 
As opiniões expressas neste trabalho são exclusivamente do(s) autor(es) e não refletem, necessariamente, a visão do Banco 
Central do Brasil. 
 




Consumer Complaints and Public Enquiries Center 
 
Address: Secre/Surel/Diate 
  Edifício-Sede – 2º subsolo 
  SBS – Quadra 3 – Zona Central 
  70074-900 Brasília – DF – Brazil 
Fax: (5561)  3414-2553 
Internet: http://www.bcb.gov.br/?english 
 Identification of Monetary Policy Shocks in the Brazilian 










The Working Papers should not be reported as representing the views of the Banco 
Central do Brasil. The views expressed in the papers are those of the author(s) and do 




We estimate an identified VAR (SVAR) with contemporaneous restrictions 
derived from a model of the market for bank reserves, which allows us to 
disentangle monetary policy shocks from demand shocks for reserves in Brazil. 
The main results are: i) the Central Bank of Brazil acts in order to smooth the 
bank reserve market interest rate (Selic); ii) the spread between the Selic rate 
and the discount rate provides information to estimate the demand curve for 
borrowed reserves; iii) overidentifying restrictions show that we cannot reject, 
for any period or model, the interest rate operational target hypothesis, even 
during the fixed exchange rate regime; iv) the impulse response functions show 
that shocks to the demand for reserves and to borrowed reserves generate 
statistically significant responses in real output and the inflation rate; v) all 
models display the liquidity effect and a small inflation rate puzzle. 
Keywords: Monetary Policy Shocks, Bank Reserves, SVAR, Brazil. 
JEL Classification: C51; E52 and E58. 
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31. Introduction 
Considering innovations in short term interest rates instead of those in the money 
stock as a monetary shock measure is currently a well disseminated practice.
4 The demand 
for money is likely affected by prices and income, as well as interest rate shocks. 
Innovations in the stock of money (Leeper e Roush, 2003, and Leeper et al., 1996) are a 
combination of policy shocks and other shocks. 
The objective of this paper is to obtain empirical evidence of how monetary policy 
shocks are identified and transmitted to other variables in the Brazilian economy. We do so 
by using information from the operational procedures of the Central Bank of Brazil for the 
bank reserve market. The adopted methodology is based on Structural (Identified) Vector 
Auto-Regressive (SVAR) models.  
  A common econometric approach to the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy is to decompose the variance-covariance matrix of the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) 
via Choleski decomposition. This approach generates a series which represents the 
monetary policy shock. Using this methodology, Bernanke and Blinder (BB) (1992) argue 
that the Fed Funds
5 rate is a good parameter to measure monetary policy in the US. On the 
other hand, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (CEE) (1996) use non-borrowed reserves, 
originated in open market transactions, to identify monetary policy. For Brazil, Minella 
(2001) treats the interest rate as the only measure of monetary policy shocks, a priori.  
  Leeper and Roush (2003) show that models that omit money (generally M1) or do 
not identify it properly can confuse monetary policy shocks and demand for money shocks. 
Therefore, the VAR innovations may be reactions to shocks in demand for bank reserves 
and the results would be more accurate if one separates  ex-ante shocks in supply from 
shocks in demand for bank reserves. This article we “put money back” into the VAR by 
using aggregates over which the Central Bank has more direct control – borrowed reserves, 
with origins in discount operations, and non-borrowed reserves
6. Therefore, this article can 
identify monetary policy innovations when Central Bank actions and the stock of money 
are endogenous. We follow Bernanke and Mihov (BM) (1995, 1998) and use a 
                                                 
4 See Soderlind (2003) and Walsh (1998). 
5 Interest rate of the market for bank reserves in the US. 
6 We build and use both series in this article. 
4specification for the bank reserve market that can include a range of alternative operational 
procedures in order to identify monetary policy measures among a set of indicators. 
  Because we identify additional sources of monetary policy variations, we are able to 
disentangle changes in reserves and in interest rates that result from exogenous policy 
actions from changes that reflect shifts in money demand. Besides testing if the BM 
(1995,1998) identification strategy gives a sense of how policy shocks affect the Brazilian 
real output and inflation rate, we pose the following questions: i) during the period 
considered, what was the operational target adopted by the Central Bank?; ii) what is the 
relationship between bank reserves and short term interest rates in Brazil?; iii) what is the 
reaction function of the Central Bank in the bank reserves market?; iv) what is the demand 
for discount window funding in Brazil?; v) does there exist a “liquidity puzzle”
7 in the 
models considered or is the liquidity effect present? 
  Our empirical model specification assumes the traditional mechanism for monetary 
policy transmission. There is a vast literature, besides that already mentioned, that adopts a 
similar methodology for other countries: Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996) for the United 
States; Kasa and Popper (1997) for Japan; De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (1999) for Italy; 
Fung and Yuan (2000) for Canada; Bernanke and Mihov (BM) (1997) and Clarida and 
Gertler (1996)
8 for Germany.  
  The main findings are as follows. First, with the exception of the 1994-1998 period, 
in which the Central Bank pursued the non-borrowed reserves target and discount rate 
target, the interest rate operational target was the most relevant for the period studied, but 
the stock of reserves also contains information about monetary policy. Second, the demand 
for reserves is considerably inelastic to interest rates, given the level of reserve 
requirements in Brazil, and the demand for borrowed reserves depends on the spread 
between the Selic
9 rate and the discount rate. Third, the demand for total reserves and for 
borrowed reserves cannot be ignored in these models because shocks to demand for bank 
reserves cause important variations in the inflation rate and real output. Fourth, the 
                                                 
7 The liquidity puzzle occurs when monetary policy shocks do not generate negative short-term 
correlations between nominal interest rates and stock of money. See, for example, Leeper and 
Gordon (1992), Thornton (2001) and Jalil (2004). 
8 Clarida and Gertler (1996) use a vector error-correction (VEC) specification. 
9 Selic rate is the rate used as inter-bank payment for reserves. These operations use federal public 
bonds (TFP) as “collateral”. 
5impulse-response functions show impacts of a shock in monetary policy, independent of the 
order of the variables in the models. With the Choleski decomposition, the impulse-
response functions are often not robust to the order in which the monetary aggregates and 
the Selic rate enter the model.
10 
  This article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology and model 
specification. Section 3 describes the data and some preliminary tests. Section 4 shows the 
results, and section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Methodology 
We apply the methodology developed by Bernanke and Mihov (BM) (1995, 1998), 
using a vector of policy variables in a structural VAR (SVAR), instead of only a scalar 
defined a priori.  
  Our assumption is that the economy can be represented by the following structural 
macroeconomic model that is an unrestricted dynamic linear model:  
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where  Yt  is a vector of non-policy variables and  Pt  is the vector of monetary policy 
variables. The block of policy variables should include all the variables potentially useful as 
an indicator of monetary policy measures (e.g., M1, interest rate, etc.). The Central Bank 
does not need to have full control of the policy variables, but should have a significant 
influence over these variables within the current period. The  v-vectors, vt
p  and vt
y, are 
mutually non-correlated (orthogonal) structural shocks, and one of them is a policy shock 
(vector) vt
p.  
                                                 
10 The impulse-response is robust only if the VAR correlation matrix of residuals shows low 
correlation between the residuals of those variables. 
6  The system represented by (1) and (2) is not identified.
11 The structural model is 
identified by imposing restrictions on the variance-covariance matrix of structural shocks 
and on the contemporaneous relations between the non-policy and policy blocks, and 
within the policy block, respectively: i) assuming the structural shocks are orthogonal; ii) 
imposing that the macroeconomic variables do not react contemporaneously to monetary 
variables, while allowing a simultaneous feedback in the opposite direction, iii) imposing 
restrictions on the monetary policy block of the model.  
  Implementing (ii), we assume that C0 = 0, that is the monetary market adjusts more 
rapidly, and the goods market more slowly. 
  Using matrix notation, (1) and (2) can be written as: 
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11 There is a total of (k+1)n
2 parameters in B, C, D and G, n parameters in the constant term when it 
exists, and n(n+1)/2 parameters in the symmetric variance-covariance matrix of the v’s. In the 
reduced form, there are kn
2 in the VAR coefficients and n in the constant, and n(n+1)/2 in the VAR 
variance-covariance matrix of residuals. This means that it is necessary to impose at least n
2 
restrictions on the structural parameters for identification.  
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where the coefficients and error terms (non-orthogonal) are defined by a direct 
correspondence with equation (4). 
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  Equation (6) represents a standard SVAR, which associates observed VAR 
residuals, u, with non-observed structural shocks, v, one (or more) of which is the policy 
shock, v
n. The equation for Pt in (5) is the policy reaction function. 
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  The models are estimated by a two-stage procedure. First, each VAR equation in (5) 
is estimated by OLS. In the second stage, we apply a structural decomposition to the VAR 
variance-covariance matrix, which results in a system of non-linear equations that is 
estimated by Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) (see Appendix A.2, equation 
3). The maximum likelihood functions are maximized numerically, using three algorithms: 
the Simplex, the Genetic and the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS)13 method.  
                                                 
12 Only some elements of  u
p are the VAR residuals corresponding to the policy block and are 
orthogonal to the VAR residuals corresponding to the non-policy block  u
y. From (5), all the 
residuals corresponding to the policy block are equal to a linear combination of orthogonal and non-
orthogonal components. 
13 In general lines, the genetic algorithm uses a stylized model of evolution, with random mutations. 
Here, the population is a vector of parameters that is compared to another vector (successor) at each 
iteration. The vector, which provides the best function value, continues in the iteration. There are 
different schemes to generate a successor, but all require that at least one of the parameters suffer a 
82.1 Model Specification 
To apply the previous methodology, one must decide which variables to include in 
the block of policy variables (P). BM (1998) includes only reserve market variables, such 
as total reserves, non-borrowed reserves and the interest rate. From July of 1996 to 
February 1999, the Brazilian Committee of Monetary Policy (Copom), during its monthly 
meeting, used to define the discount rate (Central Bank Basic rate  – TBC and also the 
Central Bank Assistance rate – TBAN), instead of setting an explicit target for the Selic 
rate. During this period, the exchange rate was relatively fixed and there was an informal 
lower bound for the Selic rate, which worked as a threshold for open market interventions 
of the Central Bank. After 1999, the floating exchange rate regime was implemented and 
the TBC and TBAN were extinguished
14. There was a period during which the bank 
discount rate was near zero. It therefore seems appropriate to alter the standard model for 
the bank reserves market in Brazil. 
  The Brazilian Central Bank participates in open market operations that influence the 
supply of bank reserves (non-borrowed reserves) and the Selic interest rate. Movements in 
the Selic rate influence the interest rate in other markets, the same way that variations in the 
total amount of bank reserves are related to movements in more broad monetary aggregates 
(M1, M2 etc). When the Central Bank intervenes in the reserves market it affects the supply 
of money, the market interest rate and the inflation rate. 
  We adopt a model for the reserves market that incorporates Bernanke and Blinder’s 
(1992), Strogin’s (1995), and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans’ (1996) models. The 
equilibrium level of reserves is determined by supply and demand interactions. In Brazil, 
we assume the demand for reserves is determined by the requirement that banks maintain 
reserves at a pre-determined proportion of its demand deposits. This required proportion of 
demand deposits is set by the Central Bank (called the reserve requirement).  
  Even though the required reserves account for the majority of the reserves a bank 
holds, the total amount of reserves is above the legal requirement, generating “excess 
reserves” that are costly to retain. The total amount of reserves is then made up of required 
                                                                                                                                                         
mutation, i.e., that a random number is added to it. The BFGS algorithm, on the other hand, is part 
of a “Quasi-Newton” models class. 
14 They existed after 1999 not for monetary policy purposes, but just as an adjustment index for 
previous contracts. 
9reserves and excess reserves. On the supply side, total reserves is equal to the amount of 
reserves banks can borrow directly from the Central Bank, the borrowed reserves,
15 plus the 
reserves supplied via open market operations – the non-borrowed reserves.  
  We estimate two classes of models: one without the external sector of the economy 
and another with it. There are two models without the external sector, one with and one 
without the discount rate (the model without the discount rate is nested in the one that 
includes it). The exclusion of the discount rate can be justified by the fact that currently it 
does not play an important role in monetary policy decisions. During the TBC and TBAN 
period, the discount rate did and that is why we consider both specifications. On the other 
hand, there is strong evidence from other countries that the demand for borrowed reserves 
depends not only on the market rate for bank reserves, but also on the spread between that 
rate and the discount rate. As pointed out by Goodfriend (1983), in addition to the spread, 
the existence of other non-pecuniary costs is also relevant to determine the equilibrium 
amount of borrowed reserves. In Brazil, for discount operations that have TFP (public 
bonds) as collateral, there are no non-pecuniary costs. During the TBC and TBAN period 
there was a pecuniary cost – a differential to the amount loaned
16.  
  In the models with the external sector, we justify the use of the exchange rate 
because Brazil is a “small open economy”.  
 
Model 1: Without the external sector and without the discount rate. 
The standard model with neither the external sector nor the discount rate has the following 
set of equations for contemporaneous innovations.
17  
 
Demand for reserves: u
RT = - a u
R + v
d             (8) 
Demand (supply) for discount: u
BR
 = b (u
R – u
D) + v
b        (9) 
Supply of non-borrowed reserves: u
NBR
 = fd v
d + fb v
b + v
n       (10) 
   
                                                 
15 Despite being part of the reserves supply, borrowed reserves are a standing facility and can be 
demanded by banks.  
16 This problem was minimized by using a discount rate weighted by the financial amounts 
negotiated. Previously to the TBC, there was a cost related to usage (amounts, frequency etc). 
17 For simplification, the t subscript was removed from the equations. 
10Equation (8) states that the demand for total reserves (u
RT) depends on the cost of 
reserves – the Selic rate (u
R) – and on the orthogonal shocks – the ones that change the 
demand for money by the public. For simplification, aggregate income and prices are part 
of the error term, as well as non-anticipated shocks in required reserves. 
  Equation (9) states that the demand for discount (uBR) depends on the spread 
between the Selic rate (u
R) and the discount rate (u
D), which is zero in this model, and on a 
shock in the amount of borrowed reserves.
18 For Brazil, only during the period from July of 
1996 to December of 1997 (and then only occasionally) was the discount rate below the 
Selic rate. In general, this rate is usually higher than the Selic, leading one to expect very 
low quantities of borrowed reserves. During the period considered, however, the amount of 
borrowed reserves was greater than zero because some banks borrow from the Central 
Bank at the end of the day because of stochastic flow of funds, imperfect access to the bank 
reserve market, etc., and because of this one expects equation (9) to hold.
19, 20  
  Equation (10) is a “reaction function” for the open market operations table. It shows 
that, even in short periods, the Central Bank can control the amount of non-borrowed 
reserves (u
NBR) by observing and compensating shocks to the bank reserve market. There 
also exists an autonomous shock to the supply of non-borrowed reserves, v
n, which is the 
policy shock of this model. 
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18 Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1998) argue that there should be an innovation for non-
borrowed reserves as an additional variable in equation (9). In a more general model, the function 
for discount depends on current and future interest rates, and non-borrowed reserve innovations 
may contain information about future spreads. This model is not confirmed in the Brazilian case 
because, when dealing with federal public bonds (TPF), the frequency of utilization is unimportant.  
19 During the TBC and TBAN period there existed a quota system which limited borrowing to meet 
required reserves at the TBC rate to a percentage of demand and time deposits. To borrow greater 
amounts banks could only borrow from the Central Bank at the greater TBAN rate. 
20 Equation (9) holds in the sense that even small quantities of non-borrowed reserves can be 
explained by the spread. Since u
D = 0 in the model, v
b only contains shocks in the Selic rate. 
11  The following cases cover those found in the literature, as suggested by BM (1995). 
Case 1 : Interest rate target (FF target). When the interest rate is the central bank’s 
operational target, fb = -1 and fd = 1. 
 
  From (8) to (10): 
 
] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( [ 1 d d b b n R v v v u f f
b a
- - + +
+
- =             (11) 
 
  The above restrictions imply that a shock to borrowed reserves leads to an equal but 
opposite response in non-borrowed reserves such that the interest rate remains fixed. A 
shock to the demand for reserves leads to an equivalent change in the supply of reserves 
through adjustments in the amount of non-borrowed reserves. However, the interest rate 
will be determined if the above restrictions are satisfied. 
  
Case 2: Non-borrowed reserves operational target (NBR target). Non-borrowed reserves 
only respond to policy shocks, which implies that fd =0 and fb = 0.  
In this case (11) yields,  
 
] [




                (11’) 
 
  Here, interest rate innovations reflect policy changes and shocks to the demand for 
both borrowed and total reserves. That is, if v
d>0
 leads to an increase in M1 (for example) 
then interest rate innovations can be positively correlated with M1 innovations, which 
would explain the liquidity puzzle.  
 
12Case 3: Borrowed reserves operational target (BR target).  
Equations (8) to (10) yield: 
 
] ) 1 ( ) ( [
1 d d b b n BR v v v u f b bf a b
b a
- - - -
+
- =           (12) 
 
  In this case, the BR target policy consists in setting fd = 1 and fb = a/b, in order to 
adjust the non-borrowed reserves so that borrowed reserves are isolated from all non-policy 
shocks. That is, non-borrowed reserves are adjusted to accommodate fluctuations in the 
total demand for reserves. The interest rate obeys: 
 
] ) 1 ( [






- = .               (11’’) 
 
Case 4: Strongin (1995). This specification corresponds to a=0 and fb=0 (NBR/RT target). 
 
Case 5: The “just identified” model. A model in which only a=0 and one verifies how the 
parameter estimates compare to those from cases 1 to 4. 
  For all three models, our strategy is to estimate the “just identified” model (case 5) 
to obtain parameter estimates. For the following models (with the discount rate and the 
external sector, respectively) cases 3 and 4 are not tested because we assess low probability 
that the BCB has set a borrowed reserve target during the period. Strogin’s (1995) model 
(case 4) can be tested within case 2.  
 
Model 2: Without the external sector and with the discount rate 
In this model there are two shocks which can be interpreted as policy shocks: the non-
borrowed reserves innovation, v n, and the discount rate innovation, v s. The model is 
comprised of the following set of equations: 
 
Demand for reserves: u
RT = - a u
R + v
d 
             (8) 
Demand (supply) for discount: u
BR = b (u
R – u
D) + v
b        (9) 
13 
Supply of non-borrowed reserves: u
NBR = fd v
d + fb v
b + fs v
s + v




 = gd v
d + gb v
b + gn v
n + v
s.         (13) 
 
  In this model, u D>0. Equation (10’) adds the positive discount shock to equation 
(10). Equation (13) describes how the central bank determines the discount rate. This 
equation is unrestricted, allowing the central bank to use the discount rate to compensate 
other shocks in the reserves market as well as autonomous innovations in the discount rate. 
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  For a large part of the sample period, the discount rate was equal to the Selic plus a 
fixed percentage, which made it appear that the Brazilian Central Bank did not adjust the 
discount rate to changes in the Selic. Hence, we also employ the following model for the 
discount rate: 
 
    Discount rate: u
D = qu
R + v
s.          (13’) 
 
  The cases considered are: 
 
Case 1: Interest rate target. The restrictions are: 
             ;   0 1       ; 0 1
s b b f bg f bg f = = - + = + -
b d d          (14) 
 
  Solving the system of equations (8), (9), (10’), (13) and (14) for the interest rate 
yields: 
14 
] ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 [(
1 s s n n b d b d d d R v v v v u b f bg bg f bg f
b a
- - - - - + - + -
+
=   (15) 
 
  The first two equations of (14) are a modification of Model 1 and imply that the 
interest rate does not respond to shocks in either the demand for reserves nor discount. The 
third restriction states that the interest rate is isolated from discount rate shocks (fs =b).
21 
 
Case 2: Non-borrowed reserves operational target. The restrictions are: 
 
fd = 0; fb = 0; fs = 0                  (16) 
 
  That is, the non-borrowed reserves depend on only their autonomous shocks and are 
not systematically adjusted in response to contemporaneous shocks in the bank reserves 
market. 
 
Case 3: Discount rate operational target (D target). One imposes: 
 
gd = 0; gb = 0; gn = 0                   (17)  
 
Case 4: “Just identified” model. Two restrictions are necessary to exactly identify Model 2. 
Since the discount rate can be used passively to adjust the bank reserve market’s interest 
rate and actively as a signal or policy instrument, one can imagine that it should respond to 
demand shocks and policy shocks. In this way, gd e gn should not be equal to zero. It is 
therefore reasonable to suppose that adjustments to shocks in the amount of borrowed 
reserves be made by varying the supply of non-borrowed reserves more slowly than the 
discount rate. In this way, identification can be achieved by setting gb=0 and a=0. 
 
                                                 
21 We also tested f
s = 0 and the results did not change.  
15Model 3: With the external sector and without the discount rate 
The model with the external sector and innovations is given by: 
 
Demand for reserves: u
RT = - a u
R + v
d 
            (8) 
 
Demand (supply) for discount: u
BR = b (u
R – u
D) + v
b         (9) 
 
Supply of non-borrowed reserves: u
NBR = fd v
d + fb v
b + fx v
x + v
n     (10’’) 
 
Exchange rate: u
EX + jd u
RT + jn u
NBR + jR u
R = v
x.          (18) 
   
Once again u
D
 = 0. Equation (10’’) incorporates the orthogonal innovation in the 
exchange rate, v
x. Equation (18) simply states that innovations in the exchange rate are 
related to innovations in all the other policy variables as well as an exogenous shock in the 
exchange rate. 
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  Only two cases (other than the “just identified” model) will be considered for this 
model, which is only slightly different from Model 1. The restrictions for the interest rate 
target case are fd = 1 and fb = -1. We also assume that the supply of non-borrowed reserves 
does not respond to innovations in the exchange rate (fx = 0). If the non-borrowed reserves 
target is implemented we have fd  = 0, fb  = 0 and fx = 0. Finally, we obtain the “just 
identified” model by setting a = fx = 0. 
 
163. Data  
All three models were estimated using monthly data on the Brazilian economy from 
1994:07 to 2004:11. In this paper, vector Y  in section 2 contains the Industrial Production 
Index – IPI – calculated by IBGE (Y) and the percentage variation of the Consumer Price 
Index  – IPCA  – also by IBGE (P)22. The policy variables include, for the various 
specifications, total reserves (RT), non-borrowed reserves (NBR), a short-term nominal 
interest rate (Selic)
23, a discount rate (D), and the nominal exchange rate (EX). Following 
BM (1998), total reserves and non-borrowed reserves were divided by a two months 
moving average of the total reserves, because of the linear structure of the identification 
scheme
24. A detailed description of the variables is presented in Appendix A.1.The original 
series are plotted in Figure A.1, Appendix A.3, after seasonal adjustments.  
  Non-borrowed reserves are obtained from borrowed reserves and total reserves. The 
output and exchange rate series are used in log-level in the VAR, while all other variables 
are used in level. All the rates in our data set are monthly averages of daily observations, 
annual rates (only inflation rate that is a monthly rate). Both the output and inflation rate 
series were seasonally adjusted.  
  Two observations are worth making. First, in Brazil throughout the period under 
consideration, there also existed a type of voluntary deposit that the banks could make at 
the Central Bank at the end of the day with their excess reserves. The remuneration rate for 
these deposits was lower than the Selic rate. Since these voluntary deposits represent a very 
small amount, this standing facility was not included with the total borrowed reserves (if 
included it would have a negative sign). Second, the amount of borrowed reserves used 
here also includes the borrowed reserves provided by the Central Bank open market 
operations table, provided at the end of the day and without a pre-specified rate. This 
represents a significant amount of borrowed reserves and ignoring it would result in 
important measurement error.  
                                                 
22 This is different from the policy vector P. 
23 Leeper et al. (1996) have shown that with the inclusion of a long-term interest rate in the VAR it 
becomes difficult to distinguish between the policy equation and the arbitrage conditions.  
24 The identification scheme is linear and therefore one should not apply the log transformation to 
the policy variables. Actually, BM (1995, 1998) uses a 36 months moving average, but because of 
our sample size, it was not possible to use such a long period moving average in our paper. We tried 
moving averages from two to six months and the results were similar. In order to preserve degrees 
of freedom we chose the two months period, as did Strongin (1995). 
17  As usual, we study the unit root properties of the series and the possibility of using a 
VEC model. However, because of the suspicion of structural breaks, we used Perron 
(1997), which does not require a priori dates for changes in the intercepts and the slopes.  
For the variables considered stable by Perron (1997) – output, inflation rate, Selic 
rate, discount rate and total reserves – we also applied Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
tests. We find that the output and the Selic rate are I(1).
25 The exchange rate and the non-
borrowed reserves are I(1), while total reserves is I(0). The auto-regressive vectors are 
estimated in level with I(1) and I(0) variables. We do not estimate a VEC model, since this 
would result in super-consistent estimates
26. We also looked for possible cointegration 
relations among the series.
27, 28  
 
4. Results  
In relation to the theoretical models of Section 2.1, the estimates consist of verifying 
monetary policy shocks for each sample period by performing the tests which have been 
discussed. We also obtained impulse response functions for some economic variables, 
including those of the bank reserve market, and Central Bank of Brazil (BC) policy reaction 
functions. 
                                                 
25 The ADF test could reject the null of a unit root at a significance level of 5%, but not 1%, for the 
Selic rate.  
26 In the sense that its asymptotic variance is O(1/T
2) instead of O(1/T)) and it captures the 
cointegration relations. The VAR estimation in level is recommended because the series could be 
almost non-stationary. Sims , Stock e Watson (1990) show that most traditional tests for large 
samples could be applied to unit root series, even if cointegrated, if the VAR is estimated in level. 
27 We applied cointegration tests for Models 1 and 2. The Johansen test indicates the presence of 2 
and 3 cointegration vectors (based on lmax and ltrace, respectively), in both models 1 and 2, but the 
results are very sensitive to specification. Besides, one should be careful with model 1, since it has 
an exogenous variable. We found structural breaks in Model 3 and, therefore, we did not apply 
traditional cointegration tests, as we will discuss later. 
28 Sometimes it is convenient to consider systems with both I(0) and I(1) variables, as in Lutkepohl 
(1999). In this case, the cointegration concept is extended to be any I(0) linear combination of 
variables. Neglecting cointegration relations is not a serious problem in the context of this paper, 
because we are interested in the short-term dynamic responses of the system. When one excludes 
cointegration restrictions, the long-term responses of some variables could take divergent paths, 
even though the short-term analysis is still valid. The specification in differences is inconsistent if 
some of the variables are cointegrated. 
184.1 Underlying VAR – Diagnosis 
We estimate all of the full sample VAR models with a constant and 2 lags
29. Models 
1 and 3 add a dummy that takes the value one before December 1998, and zero otherwise. 
The rationale behind the inclusion of the dummy is that the inflation targeting regime was 
adopted in 1999 and the exchange rate regime was also changed. We have tested other 
dummies for all models, including impulse dummies for the second semester of 2002 to 
control for the confidence crisis during that period.
30 We also include a level dummy that 
assumes the value one for April 2002, and zero otherwise, to account for the launching of 
the New Brazilian Payment System (SPB). As the results stay the same after including the 
dummies and there was no enhancement of the VARs diagnostics we have decided to use 
those model specifications with all dummies dropped except for the one for the inflation 
targeting regime. 
Tables A.I, A.II and A.III in Appendix A.3 report the residual analysis. We test the 
residuals for serial correlation, conditional heteroskedasticity and normality. At the 5% 
level, Model 1 presents serial correlation in the first lag. Model 2 has serial correlation only 
in one lag (at the 5% level, but not at the 1% level) and Model 3 for the full sample presents 
serial correlation in the initial  lags and in the fifth one. The conditional heteroscedasticy 
tests of order equal to or higher than the number of lags indicate the presence of conditional 
heteroskedasticity in the residuals for Model 3. The results indicate the absence of 
normality for the system, but indicate normal residuals for some equations.
31 
Instability in the model structure (presence of breaks) or in the parameters may give 
rise to serious misspecification errors. To avoid this problem, we conducted a Bai-Perron 
test (2003) of multiple unknown structural breaks for a vector of policy indicators, P, to the 
equations of Models 2 and 3. These results are in Table A.IV in Appendix A.3. None of the 
breaks overlap with the exception of the end of 1997, when there was evidence of policy 
changes for bank reserves and for the Selic interest rate in Model 3 (which includes the 
exchange rate). In this case, Model 3 may be incorporating the Asian Crisis in October 
                                                 
29We selected lag length based on Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). 
30Minella et al. (2003) argue that, in the last months of 2002, the inflation rate suffered from a 
structural break. A Bai-Perron (2003) VAR test for Model 2 indicates that the best break date for 
the inflation rate series is 2002:06, and the two best breaks are 1997:06 and 2002:06, respectively. 
31The reported results in Table A.III from the Appendix A.3 use the Doornik-Hansen 
ortoghonalization (1994). 
191997, when the Monetary Policy Committee (Copom) raised the TBAN to a 45% annual 
rate from 19%. The Asian Crisis is captured in total bank reserves and non-borrowed 
reserves in Model 2, as evidenced by the two best break points. 
Surprisingly, the best break point for the Selic rate in Models 2 and 3 is at the end of 
1995 and not in 1999, when the exchange rate regime changed. This is also true for Model 
3, which may indicate that Mexican Crisis had an important effect on the economy. The 
exchange rate equation shows the best break point in November 1998, a few months before 
the floating exchange rate regime launched. In general, as the breaks do not overlap, we do 
not expect any instability problems in the VAR parameters except for the full sample 
Model 3. 
In order to implement the results of the Bai-Perron (2003) tests we perform another 
test with only one unknown structural break point for the VAR estimation. The stability 
analysis was performed with the LM-type tests of Andrews-Quandt and of Andrews-
Ploberger using a heteroskedasticity robust weighted matrix. We perform tests of each 
variable on the lags of all variables for the three Models. Besides testing for individual 
coefficient stability we also follow an equation-by-equation procedure (joint coefficients 
and residual variance). 
For Model 1, in 28% of the cases the null hypothesis of coefficient stability is 
rejected at the 5% level (60 equations). The most frequent rejections are in the inflation rate 
equations (P) and NBR
32. The null hypothesis of joint coefficient stability and residual 
variance stability cannot be rejected for any equation at the 10% level. For Model 2, we can 
reject 14% of the cases, which are concentrated in the NBR equation. Again, joint tests of 
coefficients and of the residual variance are unable to reject the null hypothesis of stability. 
Model 3 rejects about 58% of cases, which are spread over several equations. Even though 
the joint test for coefficients and residuals cannot reject H0 , there is evidence that this 
model is not stable, as the Bai-Perron tests indicate. Therefore, we substituted the sub-
sample after December 1998 for the full sample
33. 
The VAR estimation of the sub-sample Model 3 uses 4 lags, which were selected 
using the absence of serial correlation as a criterion. Usual tests of serial correlation, 
                                                 
32At the 1% level the output equation also demonstrates rel evant instability. 
33Herein Model 3 refers only to the period beginning in January 1999. 
20conditional heterokedasticity and normality of the residuals are satisfactory for the sample 
starting from 1999. 
 
4.2 Structural specification  
4.2.1 Over-identification Tests 
Table I reports the p -value corresponding to the overidentifying restriction test 
(OIR), which is a likelihood ratio test, and the values of the likelihood functions (restricted 
and unrestricted) for each model and sample period
34. The sub-periods chosen correspond 
broadly to periods identified as possibly distinct operating regimes, since the inflation-
targeting regime was launched in 1999
35. The selected sub-periods are consistent with the 
Andrews-Quandt and Andrews-Ploberger tests of Section 4.1. 
 
Table I – Test for Over-identifying Restriction (OIR) 
Models  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 















FF Targeting (p-value)  0.81492  0.96778  0.24809  0.49650  0.33947  0.91665  0.12353 
logL restricted  1021.25  392.95  933.90  966.70  386.84  844.31  1220.30 
logL unrestricted  1021.28  392.95  934.56  966.93  387.30  844.31  1221.48 
NBR Targeting (p-
value)  0.00000  0.00001  0.06735  0.00589  0.32185  0.04850  6.2E-40 
1/ 
logL restricted   998.17  383.17  932.89  963.14  386.81  842.37  1131.21 
logL unrestricted  1021.28  392.95  934.56  966.93  387.30  844.31  1221.48 
NBR/TR Targeting (p-
value)  0.02614  0.10371  0.10454  -  -  -  - 
logL restricted   1018.80  391.63  933.24         
logL unrestricted  1021.28  392.95  934.56         
BR Targeting (p-value)  0.81492  0.96778  0.24809  -  -  -  - 
logL restricted  1021.25  392.95  933.90         
logL unrestricted  1021.28  392.95  934.56         
D Targeting (p-value)  -  -  -  0.00004  0.85531  0.05452  - 
logL restricted        958.52  387.28  842.46   
logL unrestricted        966.93  387.30  844.31   
 
1/ We have used a‡0. The VAR’s for Model 1 have lags of 2, 2 and 4, respectively. For Model 2, lags of 2, 2 and 2. For Model 3, a 
lag of 4.  
Obs.: The description of the each model case is in section 2.1. 
                                                 
34We have also estimated the alternative Model 2 (see section 2.1). As the results in terms of 
parameter space, signs and impulse-responses are poor, it has not been considered. 
35The inflation targeting regime was officially adopted in June 1999 in Brazil, but the break date 
considered was January 1999. 
21For Model 1 the VAR for the 1994-98 sub-sample uses 2 lags. For the 1999-2004 
sub-sample it uses 4 lags, the only one for which significant serial correlation in the 
residuals is not observed. For Model 2 the VARs for both sub-samples use 2 lags. 
Table I shows that only the Bernanke-Blinder model (1992, FF target) is not 
rejected at the 5% level neither for the full sample nor for half sample, which means that 
the interest rate is the best policy indicator. For Model 2, the second sub-sample displays 
that the BC has strongly adhered to an interest rate targeting procedure after 1999. 
Although we cannot reject the Selic interest rate targeting hypothesis, Model 3 (which 
includes the exchange rate) performs worst. 
We cannot reject the Christiano-Eichenbaum model of non-borrowed reserves 
(1996, NBR target) for the sub-sample from 1994 to 1998 to Model 2 that is we cannot 
affirm that non-borrowed reserves are not a good policy indicator for the sample period. 
For all other periods and sub-samples the hypothesis is rejected except for the second sub-
sample for Model 1 at the 10% level. 
The Strogin Model (1995, NBR/RT targeting) is more flexible in that the response 
of non-borrowed reserves to shocks in the demand for total reserves is a free parameter, 
d f , 
even though the model imposes the constraint that the demand curve for total reserves is 
vertical. For the full sample, Model 1 rejects the hypothesis that the BC adhered to the ratio 
NBR/RT as a targeting procedure. However, this procedure cannot be marginally rejected 
for the sub-samples. 
We cannot empirically disentangle the borrowed-reserve targeting procedure 
(named BR) from the FF targeting since the p -values are identical
36. Theoretically we 
encounter this result in Walsh (1998): for a model similar to Model 1; the borrowed 
reserves and the interest rate shocks are not separable when the shock to the demand for 
reserves is small. 
Differently from BM (1997), in this paper it was possible to distinguish the 
discount-rate targeting procedure from the interest-rate targeting procedure, since the p-
value rejects the discount rate as a targeting procedure for Model 2. Surprisingly the sub-
sample before 1999 does not reject discount rate targeting. Given that from July 1996 to the 
beginning of 1999 the Copom meeting had the TBC and TBAN rates as a target there is 
                                                 
36 BM (1995) has found analogous result. 
22some evidence that the model is capturing the facts. Additionally, during that period the 
discount rate (TBC) was not a punitive rate. When the discount rate returned to above 
market values, the model rejects the hypothesis of the discount-rate targeting procedure. 
In spite of some caution being necessary regarding the tests for the sub-samples 
(because of small sample size), the findings seem very reasonable. Also, all results are 
robust to changes in the lags of the underlying VAR. 
 
4.2.2 Parameter Estimates 
After t esting the overidentifying restrictions, Table II reports parameter estimates 
from Models 1, 2 and 3. The estimates give the policy reaction function of the Central Bank 
in the market for bank reserves and the demand curve for borrowed reserves. We employ 
the just-identified model and the Strongin assumption (1995) that the demand for excess 
reserves is inelastic to the interest rate ( ) 0 = a . Figure 1 displays the relationship between 









1996  1998  2000  2002  2004 
Excess Reserves 




During almost the entire period the growth rate of the reserve requirement on 
demand deposits and the excess reserves are of different orders, suggesting that in our case 
the demand for reserves may be inelastic to the interest rate. Linear regression of the excess 
                                                 
37The excess reserves are measured as log(total reserves /reserve requirementt ) and required 
reserves as log(reserve requirement t )-log(reserve requirement 1 - t ). The excess reserves are defined 
as the amount above the average of the required reserves over the maintenance period. 
23reserves on the Selic rate confirms this fact as the Selic coefficient is -0.00044. The Bai-
Perron test for the excess reserves (Table A.IV of the Appendix A.3) displays a structural 
break after Proer launched and not, as expected, after SPB implementation (April 2002). 
The Table II displays the FIML parameter estimates for the three just-identified 
models described in the Section 2.1. 
 
Table II: Parameter Estimates  








Model 1  0.000562  1.006818  -1.00311  -  -  - 
  (0.9279)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  -  -  - 
Model 2  -0.0103  0.99128  -0.9283  -0.00077  -10.9746  -51.4743 
  (0.3242)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0374)  (0.0426)  (0.0000) 
Model 3  0.02262  0.929847  -0.401698  -  -  - 
  (0.01515)  (0.0000)  (0.18901)  -  -  - 
Obs.: P-values are in parenthesis. 
 
The estimates of 
d f  and 
b f  indicate a high degree of Selic-rate smoothing for all 
models. The result is even clearer in Model 1. In this model the ß coefficient – very low – 
has the expected (although non-statistically significant) sign. 
In Model 2, the only coefficient not statistically significant is ß, which presents an 
unexpected sign. The value of 
s f  is near zero. At the first glance 
s f  has an unexpected 
sign since a discount-rate shock tends to reduce the amount of borrowed reserves and 
increase the amount of non-borrowed reserves in order to keep the interest rate constant. 
However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
s f  is equal to zero (using the just-identified 
model) at the 1% level. The 
d g  and 
n g  coefficients are negative and the latter is very high, 
which shows that movements in the discount rate are primarily driven out by monetary 
policy shocks. We might also imagine that 
d g  has an unexpected sign. However, under the 
interest-rate targeting procedure, shocks to the demand for reserves have been 
counterbalanced by a rise in non-borrowed and borrowed reserves. The increase in 
borrowed reserves is due to the reduction of the discount rate (and spread increases). In 
24other words, the Central Bank is substituting discount rate volatility for Selic rate 
volatility
38. 
Model 3 displays a high value of the  b  coefficient. Although non-significant, the 
value of 
b f  demonstrates less interest rate smoothing, which may be a result of the 
inclusion of the exchange rate. For this model the FF targeting procedure is less evident as 
Table I has already indicated. 
As the just-identified model places an exclusion restriction on  a , Table III reports 
point estimates of both  a  and  b  using the genetic algorithm for the FF targeting 
procedure. 
 
Table III – Parameter Estimates with FF Targeting 
Models \ Parameters  a  ß 
Model 1  0.00352  0.00131 
Model 2  0.00365  0.10841 
Model 3  -0.01780  0.00001 
 
From the Table III, the estimate of a  is near zero for Models 1 and 2 and it has the 
expected sign. For Model 3 its sign is unexpected and also close to zero.
39 Looking at the 
correlation matrix in Table A.V of Appendix A.3, the contemporaneous correlation 
between the innovations of the estimated VAR for the Selic rate and for the demand for 
total reserves is positive instead of negative in Model 3. As far as the FF targeting 
procedure is concerned, we would expect a negative correlation as interest-rate shocks only 
reflect monetary policy shocks. 
                                                 
38As the discount rate is a fixed percentage above the Selic rate, it seems that such an explanation is 
not reasonable. However, at least from July 1996 to February 1999, the two rates were chosen 
independently. In addition the amount of reserves supplied by the discount window of the BC open 
market desk is not negligible, and this rate does not have a very stable relationship with the Selic 
rate. Data show that since the beginning of the new, real time gross settlement payments system, 
SPB, that component of borrowed reserves has increased. The reduction of the discount rate might 
occur in such a way that maintains the rate as a punitive one. In other words, the BC may have 
accommodated rising demand through open market operations and, at the end of the day, through 
discounting operations at a less punitive discount rate. 
39For an estimation using a model similar to Model 1, CEE (1998, p. 74) found an estimate of  
-0.003. 
25The major difference among the three models is in the ß coefficient, which increases 
significantly when we consider discount rate innovations
40. 
 
4.2.3 Robustness Tests 
The advantage of using a model which extracts information about monetary policy 
from data on bank reserves and the interest rate is that the parameter space has a 
straightforward economic interpretation. Therefore we can use adequate prior information 
in order to restrict the acceptable identification schemes. To verify if our identification 
scheme generates an admissible parameter space, we consider the following inequality 
constraints, which weaken the constraints imposed by BM (1995, 1997, 1998): 
 
a ‡ 0 (19) 
b ‡ 0 (20) 
fd ‡ 0 (21) 
fb £ 0 (22) 
 
These constraints imply that: for (19), the demand curve for total reserves is non-
positive; for (20), the borrowed reserves function has a non-negative slope in the space of 
borrowed reserves and spread; for (21) and (22) that the BC performs interest-rate 
smoothing to some degree (or, in the case of Model 2, aims at smoothing) or at least it does 
not respond to disturbances in the market for reserves. Table IV displays the results for 
Models 1, 2 and 3. 
 
Table IV – Inequality Restrictions – P – value for OIR Tests  
Models  a‡0, f
d‡0, f
b£0  a‡0, b‡0, f
d‡0, f
b£0 
Model 1  1  1 
Model 2  0.57261  0.72237 
Model 3  0.99994  1,00000 
 
                                                 
40This estimate is very close to the BM (1995) estimation for the sample period 1775:1-1981:6  in 
the USA. 
26Note that all models demonstrate well-behaved demand and supply curves and some 
degree of interest-rate smoothing. Model 2 has a smaller p-value and its constraints 
d f  and 
b f  do not exactly correspond to the model of interest-rate targeting, as Section 2.1 shows. 
Robustness tests are also performed with the sample size from 1994 to 2004:07. The 
results are robust to the sample size. We do not change the order of the variables because 
there is no theoretical reason to do so.
41 As inflation targeting in Brazil is aimed at the 




4.3 Impulse Response Functions 
The monetary policy measure generated by the structural decomposition allows us 
to examine the behavior of the economy after monetary policy shocks. It is worth stating 
that in this article an innovation in the monetary policy measure is a linear combination of 
VAR estimation policy block innovations (of the total reserves, non-borrowed reserves, 
Selic rate, discount rate and exchange rate) as equation (7) shows. 
It is possible that the absence of the liquidity puzzle is related to the proper 
identification of the contemporaneous correlations of VAR, a fact that we can verify with 
the impulse response functions. Since we use the inflation rate instead of the price level, we 
can only test if an inflation rate puzzle occurs. 
Figures 2 and 3 show the impulse response functions (solid lines) generated by  a 
standard-deviation shock to the structural innovations in Models 2 and 3. Each column 
represents the responses of the different variables to a specific shock. The responses are 
shown in the time interval from 0 to 23 months. For the variables that are in log-level, the 
vertical axis indicates the percentage deviation of each variable from the benchmark case 
without a shock (0.02 represents a 2% deviation). For the variables that are in level, the 
vertical axis indicates deviation in percentage points from the benchmark case. The two-
standard-error bands (dashed lines) are computed as in Sims and Zha (1999), through 
Monte Carlo integration with 2500 draws. All responses present mean reversion. 
                                                 
41In fact, CEE (1998) shows that what matters is if the variables come before or after the policy 
variables. The intra-block order is not relevant in terms of impulse response functions. 
42In Model 2 we also substitute IGP-M for IPCA and the results keep the same. 
274.3.1 Benchmark Model (Model 2) 
a) Market for Bank Reserves 
Figure 2 displays the dynamic responses of all variables to different shocks for the 
VAR estimation of Model 2 (Benchmark Model). Since the hypothesis that the Central 
Bank has the interest rate as a target cannot be rejected in any model and for any period, the 
monetary policy shock is the one-standard deviation of v
n , with v
n >0. For the sample 
period 1994-1998 it would be reasonable to also consider v
s as a monetary policy shock, 
but some caution is necessary due to a possible small sample bias. 
A positive monetary policy shock should increase the total reserves, reduce the Selic 
rate and increase price and output. Because of our identification scheme, the increase in the 
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28The response to the v 
n shock displays a small inflation rate puzzle, but the 
statistical uncertainty concerning this result is very large. The puzzle seems smaller for the 
discount rate shock.
43 The v
n shock, on the other hand, produces an output increase for a 
time-horizon of more than 24 months. The v
s shock generates a smaller, non-statistically 
significant, increase. The response to the v
n is fast since the output already increases from 
the second month onward. The maximum output increase occurs at about the 10
th month, 
differently from Minella (2001) who finds a maximum response between three and seven 
months. In quantitative terms, the negative variation of one percentage point in the Selic 
rate (expressed p. y.), due to a shock of 0.187 standard deviation in v
n, follows a maximum 
output increase of about 0.19%. 
A positive shock to the demand for reserves – v
d  – does not affect the Selic or the 
discount rates (in spite of a small initial decrease) and it increases the total and non-
borrowed reserves. The path of both reserves is almost the same, which means that the 
amount of borrowed reserves stays constant. These findings are consistent with the interest 
rate targeting procedure. It is worth mentioning that shocks to the demand for reserves lead 
to an increase in the real output and have no effect on the interest rate, a finding similar to 
the calibrated model of Leeper and Roush (2003). 
A shock to borrowed reserves – v
d  – does not affect the non-borrowed reserves and 
reduces the Selic rate, which is consistent with the non-borrowed targeting procedure, 
although the total of reserves only increases later on. This behavior may be related to the 
fact that if we use a specific sub-sample we cannot reject the non-borrowed reserves 
targeting hypothesis The results are also consistent with the hypothesis of an interest rate 
target since the total of reserves hardly changes and the variation in the non-borrowed 
reserves is not statistically significant. However, the decrease in the interest rate is only 
significant in the initial period, which may be indicating that when the shock comes from 
the borrowed reserves, the BC does not smooth the interest rate. The shock to borrowed 
reserves leads to a statistically significant increase in the inflation rate. 
                                                 
43Bernanke and Mihov (1997) found a large price puzzle for v
n  and none for v
s.   
29b) Inflation Rate 
For the full sample the response of the inflation rate to its own shock lasts about 
seven months as Figure A.1 in Appendix A.3 displays. After 24 months, the initial shock is 
responsible for an increase of 0.000658 percentage point in the inflation rate p.m. For the 
two sub-samples, before and after 1999, the persistence seems larger for the fixed exchange 
rate period, as we can see in the same Figure. This finding is consistent with Minella et al. 
(2003) and provides evidence that the implementation of the floating exchange rate regime 
might have reduced inflationary persistence. 
 
c) Reaction of the Selic Rate to Shocks to Real Output and to the Inflation Rate 
It seems that the BC is more likely to react with some delay to output shocks as the 
Selic rate begins to increase only after some months. The total reserves do not change in 
response to shocks in Y, which is expected since in Brazil most of demand for reserves 
comes from the reserve requirements. 
A shock to the inflation rate generates a small increase in the Selic rate in the initial 
period, although the result is not statistically significant. However, the response of the 
nominal interest rate is smaller than the increase of the inflation rate and, therefore, the ex-
post real interest rate is negative.
44 As we h ave strong evidence that the Central Bank 
smoothes the Selic rate (see Section 4.2.1), one may think that the Central Bank does make 
an instantaneous adjustment of the interest rate to its optimal level to avoid jumps. 
For the first time periods, total and borrowed reserves respond negatively to an 
inflation rate shock. 
 
d) Liquidity Effect 
We can find clear evidence of the liquidity effect using the identified model of this 
paper. Nowadays it is recognized that a positive short-run correlation between money and 
interest rate may reflect an endogenous response of the central bank to money demand 
shocks, under some degree of smoothness of the interest rate. The endogeneity issue leads 
                                                 
44As noted earlier, the Selic rate is expressed p. y. while the inflation rate is p. m. 
30to the rejection of the liquidity effect in traditional VAR with the Choleski 
decomposition.
45 
There is a significant liquidity effect in Model 2, as Figure A.2 in Appendix A.3 
shows:
46 one-standard error in v 
n  produces an initial decline in the Selic rate of 5.3 
percentage points for the sample from 1994:09 to 2004:11, and this statistically significant 
effect lasts for more than eight months. In addition the liquidity effect is present in both 
samples and is more pronounced in the first sample, as we can see in the same Figure. 
 
4.3.2 Model 3 
The impulse response functions for this model should be considered with some 
caution because of the small sample problem (71 observations). Any unexpected results 
may be due to a simultaneity issue between the exchange rate and the interest rate and the 
BC policy reaction to exchange rate changes. 
Beginning with the monetary policy shock v
n, we can see the liquidity effect in 
Figure 3 above. The shock generates an increase in the non-borrowed reserves and a 
decrease in borrowed reserves, as the total reserves are constant. The response in output is 
not statistically significant. The shock is also associated with an unexpected nominal 
appreciation of the exchange rate and reduction in the inflation rate, which turns out to be 
statistically significant only after six months. The Selic rate declines for several months 
after the initial policy shock, although the statistical uncertainty concerning this result is not 
negligible. 
 
                                                 
45The models were re-estimated with lags of 2, 2 and 4 periods, respectively, using the Choleski 
decomposition and two orders for the variables RT and NBR. In the first, RT comes before NBR 
and in the second, the opposite occurs. The order of the variables Y, P, Selic, D and EX stays the 
same. Only for the VAR whose non-borrowed reserves come before the total reserves is the 
liquidity effect significant in some period. The model with the exchange rate does not display the 
liquidity effect at the beginning. The relevance of the liquidity effect depends on the order of the 
variables in the decomposition. 
46With a  =0, only a shock in the demand for reserves produces contemporaneous effect in total 
reserves in the money market. Therefore, we define the liquidity effect as a short-run negative 
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The shock to the exchange rate  – v
x– represents depreciation and generates a 
statistically significant increase in the inflation rate. In other words, twelve months after the 
initial shock to the exchange rate of 2.5%, the inflation rate displays a cumulative increase 
of 0.5 percentage points. The lagged output decrease is not significantly significant. The 
exchange rate depreciation is followed by an increase in non-borrowed and in total reserves 
and the response of these variables is stronger than their response to the policy shock v
n. 
The Selic rate increases in the following periods.  
The shock to the demand for reserves – v
d – increases the amount of total and non-
borrowed reserves, while the non-borrowed reserves stay almost constant. The Selic rate 
32and the exchange rate have small changes. There is no remarkable effect in the output and 
in the inflation rate. 
The shock to the borrowed reserves  – v
b   – does not initially change the total 
reserves. It provokes a small reduction in the total reserves, which is consistent with interest 
rate targeting. The Selic and the exchange rate decrease, although this decline is not 
statistically significant. The inflation rate also falls off. The response for output is not 
statistically significant. 
Model 3 shows a degree of inflation rate persistence similar to the sub-sample 
Model 2 (starting from 1999). The response of the Selic rate to an inflation rate shock is as 
expected (positive) and that of the output is very small. The responses of the exchange rate 
to the same variables are not accurately estimated. 
 
5 Conclusions 
Contemporaneous correlations between reserves (money) and the interest rate are 
relevant since reserves are strongly correlated with future prices and output. Recursive 
identification schemes perform an extreme decomposition of the structural shocks which 
are not robust to the order that the variables enter into the decomposition: (a) if money is 
predetermined to interest rate, then no correlation is attributed to the monetary p olicy 
shock; (b) if the interest rate is predetermined to money, all correlation is attributed to the 
policy shock. As we simultaneously identify the interest rate and reserves it is not necessary 
to impose either (a) or (b), although estimates might result in (a) or (b). Given that, in our 
model, the correlation between interest rate and bank reserves derives from the interaction 
between supply and demand in that market, it is easy to disentangle the policy shock from 
the shock to the demand for reserves (and for discounting). 
There is evidence that we were able to extract a less "contaminated" policy shock 
since the responses of real output and of the inflation rate to shocks to the demand for 
reserves and borrowed reserves are statistically significant. 
During the full sample period, we find strong evidence that the BC has the interest 
rate (Selic rate) as its operational goal, even when the Monetary Policy Committee 
announced the discount rates (TBC and TBAN) instead of the Selic rate. 
33The estimation of the borrowed reserves curve in a multivariate context shows that 
the spread between the Selic rate and the discount rate produces information for estimating 
the amount of discount. In addition, as expected, the monthly demand for reserves is 
inelastic to the interest rate. The estimates of the reaction function of the BC open-market 
desk and of the borrowing function display the expected signs. An important finding is that 
the discount rate is important in monetary policy studies. 
The liquidity effect is present in all the empirical models we have tested, being 
larger in Model 2 (with the discount rate). In addition, the common finding that persistence 
of the inflation rate seems to have decreased after the implementation of the floating 
exchange rate regime in 1999 is corroborated. 
The responses of the monetary policy shocks on output are as expected and 
statistically significant. The effect on the inflation rate is less conclusive, and there is a 
small inflation rate puzzle. If one does not incorporate shocks to the demand for money 
(reserves) in a model that includes some money aggregate, the results might be different 
from those found in this paper regarding the size and the length of response of the policy 
shock on real output.
47 
Another main conclusion is  that, due to structural breaks, it may be harmful to 
consider the full sample period after the Real Plan in Model 3, which includes the exchange 
rate. When the exchange rate is not present, structural breaks are not detected. 
Finally, the launch of the Brazilian Payment System does not affect the results, 
although banks might have begun to manage bank reserves in a different way. 
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36A Appendix 
A.1 Time Series: Description 
We have constructed the series RT, NBR and D from data of the Central Bank of Brazil. 
All data are available through the Internet on the site www.bcb.gov.br. 
Y – the IPI variable was deseasonalized by a SARIMA Model, beginning from 1994:07; 
P – the IPCA variable (percentage change p.m.) was deseasonalized by a SARIMA Model, 
beginning from 1994:07; 
RT – sum of bank reserves and bank's vault cash, average of daily balances; 
NBR  – this variable is the difference between total reserves and borrowed reserves. 
Borrowed reserves are the loans that the BC grants to banks to supply their short-run 
liquidity needs. We add the borrowed reserves from two periods. For the period before 
1996:07, we have considered lending facilities up to the draft limit. From 1996:07 onwards, 
we have considered the operations based on TBC and TBAN rates, which have treasury 
bonds as collateral, and the discount window daily operations after 1999, also backed by 
treasury bonds. In the whole period we have included the operations performed by the BC 
open-market desk at the end of the day and with individual banks. The data are monthly 
average of daily balances; 
R – interest rate of the market for bank reserves (named Selic rate), monthly average per 
year; 
D  – discount rate. The traditional discount rates are a non-weighted average of daily 
discount rates, disregarding the daily financial volumes (data not available). The discount 
rate set by the open-market desk is weighted by financial volumes. The final discount rate 
is weighted by the monthly financial volumes of the two pieces of discount window (the 
traditional and the one from the desk); 
EX – purchase exchange rate R$/USD, monthly average.
37A.2 Relation between Orthogonal and Observed Innovations in the A-B Model  
Usually, an identified VAR model is a class of differential stochastic linear equation 
models: 
 
t t v y L = G ) (                        (1) 
 
where yt is a vector of stochastic process that has an AR representation of finite order; G 
is a matrix polynomial with positive exponent of the lag operator L and  0 G  is full rank 
matrix. For identified VAR,  t v Var( = S ) must be diagonal, that is E(v t vt'| y s t- , s>0) = D; 
E(v t |y  s t- , s>0) = 0, "t and the errors vt are Gaussian. 
Let’s assume that if (1) is multiplied by 
1
0
- G  we will have the reduced form (VAR) 
of the model: 
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Let A and B be n-order invertible matrices, such that Aut =Bvt. Therefore from (2),  0 G =B 
1 - A. The A matrix makes a linear transformation in ut, generating a new vector that is 
linear combinations (via B) of n orthogonal shocks. The model in the form above is the A-
B Model (vide Amisano and Giannini, 1997). 
The likelihood function, in log, has the form: 
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Integrating out the function in relation to C, the marginal p.d.f. is proportional to: 
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where k is the number of variables on the right side of the equation and  ût are the OLS 
estimates of u t. If we concentrate the likelihood in relation to C, keeping constant 
380 G =B
1 - A, we obtain the same expression as before, except that T-k substitutes T. In short, 
the function is: 
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39A.3 Results 
Table A.II – Test for Normality of Residuals (Jarque-Bera)  
   System   Y  P  RT  NBR  R  D  EX 
Model 1  83.1419  5.5339  17.5516  1.2086  28.3825  30.4654       
   (0.0000)  (0.0629)  (0.0002)  (0.5465)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)       
Model 2  77.0977  5.8423  14.1859  2.0859  27.1688  21.9100  5.9048    
   (0.0000)  (0.0539)  (0.0008)  (0.3524)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0522)    
Model 3  70.6421  6.8281  6.7113  2.1755  23.1456  25.1863     6.5954 
   (0.0000)  (0.0329)  (0.0349)  (0.3370)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)     (0.0370) 
Table A.III – Test for Conditional Heterokedasticity   
Series  Y  P  RT  NBR  R  D  EX 
Model 1                 
ARCH(2)  F(2.116)  0.4979  0.3718  0.6353  3.1143  1.9810       
   c
2  0.9957  0.7437  1.2705  6.2286  3.9620       
      (0.6078)  (0.6895)  (0.5298)  (0.0444)  (0.1379)       
ARCH(6)  F(6.108)  0.5273  0.2658  1.4367  6.4835  1.2137       
   c
2  3.1640  1.5947  8.6204  38.9012  7.2825       
      (0.7880)  (0.9530)  (0.1961)  (0.0000)  (0.2955)       
Model 2                 
ARCH(2)  F(2.116)  0.1216  0.3113  0.7695  2.9123  1.2102  0.7651    
   c
2  0.2433  0.6225  1.5389  5.8245  2.4204  1.5301    
      (0.8855)  (0.7325)  (0.4633)  (0.0544)  (0.2981)  (0.4653)    
ARCH(6)  F(6.108)  0.3264  0.2065  2.0454  7.2385  0.7061  0.3919    
   c
2  1.9587  1.2393  12.2724  43.4311  4.2363  2.3515    
      (0.9235)  (0.9749)  (0.0562)  (0.0000)  (0.6447)  (0.8847)    
 
Table A.I – Test LM for Serial Correlation 
Models  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 (full sample) 
Lags  Statistics   Prob.  Statistics  Prob.  Statistics  Prob. 
1  47.4645  0.0043  54.1823  0.0264  80.6059  0.0000 
2  36.5614  0.0635  43.4732  0.1831  50.7630  0.0523 
3  34.8065  0.0918  42.9581  0.1977  37.7311  0.3900 
4  28.1701  0.3001  39.6854  0.3091  40.9424  0.2625 
5  36.1113  0.0699  43.6759  0.1776  52.8501  0.0347 
6  26.5078  0.3809  39.2722  0.3254  33.7435  0.5764 
7  34.8655  0.0907  45.0103  0.1442  40.0726  0.2943 
8  14.7094  0.9479  21.5236  0.9731  23.1164  0.9524 
9  23.5278  0.5468  25.2812  0.9091  32.4763  0.6370 
10  26.2985  0.3918  38.5765  0.3539  30.0637  0.7462 
11  14.3177  0.9559  23.7054  0.9425  21.5885  0.9724 
40Model 3 (full sample) 
ARCH(2)  F(2.116)  0.2311  0.1357  0.6866  3.2989  2.3271     18.6219 
   c
2  0.4623  0.2714  1.3732  6.5979  4.6542     37.2438 
      (0.7936)  (0.8731)  (0.5033)  (0.0369)  (0.0976)     (0.0000) 
ARCH(6)  F(6.108)  0.3177  0.2341  1.4594  6.7154  1.5066     6.1094 
   c
2  1.9063  1.4044  8.7561  40.2924  9.0398     36.6563 
      (0.9281)  (0.9656)  (0.1878)  (0.0000)  (0.1714)     (0.0000) 
Obs.: P-values in parenthesis. 
 
Table A.IV – Bai-Perron Test (2003) for Multiple Structural Changes 
Model 2          
Statistics  RT  NBR  R  D 
Best break point  12/1996  12/1996  09/1995  09/1995 
SSR  0.54336  0.81484  1325.23606  1800.92584 
BIC  -4.40496  -3.99974  3.39437  3.70108 
Two best points  08/1996 e 12/1997  07/1996 e 11/1997  09/1995 e 09/1998 
09/1995 e 
09/1998 
SSR  0.34544  0.38058  547.25753  864.86083 
BIC  -4.34931  -4.25242  3.01855  3.4762 
 
         
Model 3          
Statistics  RT  NBR  R  EX 
Best break point  12/1996  12/1996  11/1995  11/1998 
SSR  0.53951  0.79791  1229.15054  0.12296 
BIC  -4.33383  -3.94248  3.39735  -5.81261 
Two best points  07/1996 e 01/1998  07/1996 e 11/1997  12/1995 e 11/1997 
11/1998 e 
04/2002 
SSR  0.31394  0.38783  666.3439  0.05434 
BIC  -4.32756  -4.11618  3.33281  -6.08151 
         
         
Statistics  Excess Reserves       
Best break point  04/1996       
SSR  0.00668       
BIC  -9.66374       
Two best points  08/1995 e 01/1997       
SSR  0.00355       
BIC  -10.21794       
 
41Table A.V – Contemporaneous Correlation Among Monetary Aggregates and Rates 
Models  Variables  RT  NBR 
Model 1  R  -0.211759915  -0.188457808 
Model 2  R  -0.214787204  -0.209534796 
   D  -0.183178375  -0.158670778 
Model 3  R  0.266333916  0.279017079 
   EX  0.161198241  0.114825742 
Obs: Correlations from the VAR residuals of lags 2. 2 e 4. respectively. 
42Figure A.1 
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